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 “[T]he discourse on ethnicity has escaped from academia and into the field. [...] 
[T]here is certainly a designer organism out there now, bred in the laboratory 
and released into the world to be fed by politicians, journalists, and ordinary 
citizens through their words and actions” (Banks 1996: 189).  
In the Nepalese Constituent Assembly elections of 2008 among the 74 
registered parties, the Tamsaling Nepal Rastriya Dal (Tamsaling Nepal 
National Party, TRD) promoted the concept of transforming Nepal into a 
federal state based on ethnic groups’1 ancestral homelands. The claim 
for ethnic groups’ self-determination is one of the major political is-
sues the Constituent Assembly is facing today while working towards a 
new constitution for what was the world’s last Hindu kingdom. Already 
in the early 1990s, Parshuram Tamang, who at that time was head of 
the Nepal Tamang Ghedung (Nepal Tamang Association, NTG), Nepal’s 
largest national Tamang organization, argued for a cantonal approach 
and the reorganization of the local government in order to decentralize 
power and enable ethnic communities to actively engage in politics. 
Significantly, as early as 1992 he referred to the group that constitutes 
5.6 percent of the total Nepalese population, and thereby forms the 
third largest ethnic group in Nepal2, as a “nation, which has inhabited 
[the] hills for longer than any other group” (Tamang 1992: 25). These 
developments are embedded in a broader process of ethnic activism 
in Nepal, which started to flourish after the Panchayat era3 came to 
an end in 1990 with the massive protests of the Jan Andolan, the first 
people’s movement.
Besides the Dalit’s and Women’s movements, adivasi janajati (indig-
enous nationalities) activism, united under the leadership of the Nepal 
Janajati Adivasi Mahasangh (Nepal Federation of Indigenous People, NE-
FIN), is the major civil society movement in post-1990 Nepal. It aims to 
shape a new constitutional and political framework that ensures rights 
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and inclusion of the country’s diverse ethnic groups.  With the establish-
ment of the National Foundation for Development of Indigenous Nation-
alities (NFDIN) in 2002 and the subsequent recognition of 59 adivasi 
janajati, the government responded to the overall demands of ethnic 
activists and officially acknowledged issues related to the ethnic cause. 
Furthermore the Nepalese government signalled its obligation towards 
the special support of ethnic groups by defining specific targets for the 
development of adivasi janajati in the Three Year Interim Plan 2008-
10. By ratifying the ILO No. 169 Convention on Indigenous and Tribal 
People, the only legally binding international instrument concerned with 
the rights of indigenous people and the adoption of the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous People in 2007, Nepal joined the worldwide 
discourse on indigenousness at the legal level and promised its commit-
ment to international standards.
This selection of events in the Himalayan country’s recent history 
illustrates the fact that the discourse on ethnicity and its consequent 
political demands are an integral part of the current political debate. 
Therefore, following Banks (1996: 189), I will argue that Nepal pro-
vides one example of how the discourse on ethnicity is no longer a sole-
ly academic exercise but has entered the public and political sphere. 
Identities based on the fact of belonging to a particular ethnic group 
were accepted as valid legal categories in post-1990 Nepal and now 
form the basis for the implementation of government actions and pro-
grammes. After the restoration of multi-party democracy in 1990, the 
new political and legal framework enabled more groups and individuals 
to actively participate in the discourse on ethnicity, which was strongly 
shaped by and in response to the adivasi janajati movement in Nepal 
as well as the international discourse on indigenousness. At the same 
time the categories produced in the current discourse have to be in-
terpreted with reference to ethnicity formation processes linked to the 
Nepalese state formation. 
By focusing on the Tamang the article endeavours to provide a de-
tailed analysis of the process of ethnicity formation and ethnic activism 
for one particular Nepalese ethnic group. After a brief outline of the 
main academic positions towards the study of ethnicity, an examination 
on how this category has been utilised by scholars to describe people’s 
identity in the Himalayan region follows. Subsequently a depiction of 
the Tamang embedded in the western discourse on ethnicity provides 
an anthropological perspective on Tamang identity before the role of 
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the Nepalese state formation in the creation of a pan-Tamang identity 
is examined. In the second part of the article the post-1990 political 
framework and its implications for ethnic activism will be outlined. A 
brief discussion of the general janajati adivasi movement is followed 
by an analysis of Tamang ethnic activism. It will be demonstrated, that 
activists in order to serve their “imagined”4 group’s specific needs and 
to legitimate social, economic and political claims highlight certain ele-
ments, which are assumed to constitute ethnic identity. By focussing 
on one ethnic activist the importance of individuals in defining the dis-
course will be demonstrated, after which an examination of the Nepal 
Tamang Ghedung, the oldest and largest Tamang organization of Nepal 
and the Tamsaling Nepal Rastriya Dal, the first ethnic based Tamang 
political party will illustrate the changes the adivasi janajati movement 
as a whole has undergone between 1990 and 2010.  
Ethnicity and Ethnic Identity: Primordialism, Instrumentalism 
and Beyond  
When studying the literature produced on ethnicity in the past decades 
it becomes obvious that despite its popularity in academia and the pub-
lic discourse, the concept is fuzzy, applied in a variety of contexts and 
used to describe many different things. Therefore Banks draws the con-
clusion that ethnicity is best understood as “a collection of rather sim-
plistic and obvious statements about boundaries, otherness, goals and 
achievements, being and identity, descent and classification” (Banks 
1996: 190). Chapman et al. define ethnicity as an abstract noun “mean-
ing what you have if you are an ‘ethnic group’” (Chapman et al. 1989: 
15), simultaneously pointing out the potential of the term to stress the 
duality of “us“ and “the other” since not everyone in today’s world is 
classified as belonging to a particular ethnic group. The discourse on 
ethnicity is furthermore surrounded by debates on the process of clas-
sification, history, race and nationalism among others, which makes the 
issue even more complex.5 
In the conventional academic literature two main approaches to-
wards the study of ethnicity can be distinguished: primordialism and 
instrumentalism (O’Reilly 2001: 3; Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 7ff.). 
The primordialist approach treats ethnicity as a cultural given, that is a 
permanent and fundamental aspect of human identity, which has per-
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sisted over long periods of time. Therefore the sum of certain features 
such as language, dress and so on is assumed to constitute the core 
of ethnic identity. Hence scholars adopting the primordial approach are 
mainly interested in identifying the features constituting primordial ties 
and examining in which ways they shape people’s lives (ibid.: 8). Today 
scholars usually try to distance themselves from a primordialist approach 
to interpret ethnicity because it simplifies and tends to display identity as 
fixed and unproblematic. Smith (1986: 16f.) for example, even though 
suggesting that an ethnic group generally exhibits six features (a collec-
tive name, common myth of descent, shared history, distinctive shared 
culture, association with a specific territory and sense of solidarity) to a 
varying degree, carefully distances himself from primordialist assump-
tions. However some anthropologists favour the primordial view in so 
far as they argue scholars should adopt the emic perspective or the “na-
tive’s point of view” in order to take into account the self-perception of 
the group, rather than imposing external explanations of ethnicity on the 
people they study. By contrast, instrumentalists stress the constructed 
character of ethnicity, which they argue developed in a particular histori-
cal and social context and can be utilized to serve a group’s social, eco-
nomic and political claims. Glazer and Moynihan (1975: 5) in their often-
cited collection of essays Ethnicity: Theory and Experience for example 
define ethnicity as a social fact and a relatively recent phenomenon.
The instrumentalist approach is today by far the more commonly 
adopted one in the analysis of ethnicity. Instrumentalists are concerned 
with the power structures underlying claims over ethnicity and aim to 
analyse the ways in which certain features of ethnic identity are high-
lighted and chosen to represent a group. Nevertheless, some scholars 
also highlight the danger of interpreting ethnicity in overly instrumental 
terms. O’ Reilly (2001: 4) adds for consideration that even though eth-
nic identities are to some degree constructed and politicized, the fea-
tures chosen in the struggle for resources have a deep meaning for the 
people studied. Besides these two main approaches, especially in the 
past two decades scholars have started to overcome the dichotomy and 
to think further. Banks (1996: 185ff.) suggests an approach that shifts 
the focus on ethnicity from the ethnographic subject to the analyst. He 
describes ethnicity as an analytic tool invented by western scholars to 
understand and interpret the actions and feelings of the people they 
study. Furthermore this approach offers analysts the opportunity to 
communicate with each other about phenomena observed and studied 
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in a shared academic language. This view on ethnicity can be read as 
being part of a broader development in anthropology, which started to 
question core concepts such as kinship and called for a more reflexive 
and critical approach towards the discipline itself.6
The Concepts Applied to the Nepali Context  
After the democratic opening of Nepal in 1990 and the growing presence 
and visibility of ethnicity in the political sphere, scholars working on 
Nepal started to pay more attention to ethnicity and identity issues.7 A 
major contribution to the discourse was the edited volume Nationalism 
and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics and Culture of Contem-
porary Nepal8 that unites historical and anthropological perspectives. In 
the introduction David Gellner provides a detailed account of the theo-
retical debate and adds some modifications for the South Asian context. 
In postulating that an ethnic group does not necessarily need a shared 
myth of origin, an observation he makes in reference to the Newar com-
munity of Nepal, he adapts Smith’s six criteria for the Nepali context, 
but is careful to state at the same time, that ethnic feelings develop 
in particular contexts of opposition and competition and can therefore 
be understood as a response to contemporary pressure (Gellner 2008, 
1997: 9ff.; 16). Even though he explains in detail the weaknesses of 
the primordial approach, he states at the same time, “no extreme in-
strumentalist position will be defended here” (ibid.: 7). In response to a 
critical book review of the essay collection by a Nepalese scholar, Gell-
ner formulates five rules addressing the question how ethnicity and na-
tionalism should be studied: Ethnicity and nationalism are by no means 
“natural” categories and need to be studied from the perspective of 
ordinary people, since it would be mistaken to assume activists and the 
people they aim to represent share the same agenda. Scholars should 
be aware of group boundaries’ fluidity and context-dependency. Finally 
ethnicity and nationalism need to be studied in historical context (ibid.: 
1-10). In more recent works, he criticizes a primordial approach more 
directly; for example in an article about ethnic organizations in Nepal 
he states that “[a]ny form of primordialism, whether biological or other 
would be quite out of place in the analysis of contemporary groups” 
(Gellner and Karki 2008: 115). 
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In general most scholars favour instrumentalism in the analysis of 
Nepalese identity and ethnicity formation and stress their constructed 
character. Nevertheless there exist also critical voices towards the in-
strumentalist approach. Mukta Lama-Tamang (2009: 274) for example 
warns that understanding identity and ethnicity as a product imposed 
by powerful others might favour the dominant discourse at the expense 
of the margins and might deny a group’s history. In the introduction of 
another major contribution that aims to present a variety of approaches 
towards the study of ethnicity, the authors come closer to Banks’ no-
tion of ethnicity as a scholarly concept by stating “…the notion of ethnic 
group is a western construction which has no exact equivalent in the 
Himalayan region…” (Lecomte-Tilouine and Dreyfuß 2003: 2). In the 
same volume Martin Sökefeld challenges the dominance of ethnicity as 
an analytical framework in the study of identity processes. He argues 
that by highlighting ethnicity as the major factor constituting a person’s 
identity scholars overlook the fact that a person possesses a variety of 
identities. Thus he suggests a more postmodernist approach that com-
bines the psychological focus on individual self-identity and the social 
science approach towards identity as being mainly determined by the 
relation towards other people, that is the identity of a group (Sökefeld 
2003: 307ff.). Significantly Krishna Hachhetu (2003: 217f.), a Nepali 
scholar and political scientist, draws attention towards the fact that the 
approach of foreign and Nepali scholars differs in so far as that while 
most foreign scholars slightly favour an instrumentalist approach, Ne-
pali scholars tend to opt for a joined approach of primordialism and in-
strumentalism in the study of ethnicity. In addition, native analysts, that 
is scholars from within ethnic groups tend to see the ethnic movement 
in Nepal from a perspective that highlights the struggle against discrimi-
nation and the principles of equality and move beyond the theoretical 
debate about primordialism versus instrumentalism (Bhattachan cited 
in Hachhethu 2003: 218).
It follows from this short overview that ethnicity as an academic 
concept itself is subject to change and constant negotiation. The follow-
ing analysis of the post-1990 Nepalese political framework and Tamang 
ethnic activism is articulated within the framework of instrumentalism. 
However this is a western academic approach that has its limitations, 
especially when taking into account the views of ethnic activists and 
scholars who formulate a differing approach to legitimize their interpre-
tations of history and economic, social and political claims. Furthermore 
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ethnicity is only one factor contributing to a person’s or group identity. 
I will make use of the term ethnic category when talking about the ab-
stract academic concept, since it leaves open to which extend people 
included in this category perceive themselves as an ethnic group.  In 
contrast the term ethnic group is applied when it comes to political cat-
egories, which are in usage and defined by certain actors (Gellner 2008, 
1997: 30). 
Who are the Tamang? - Anthropological Perspectives 
People today who fall under the ethnic category Tamang are settled 
around the Kathmandu valley and as far as the Tibetan plateau to the 
North. Towards the west the Buri Gandaki River constitutes a natural 
boundary to Gurung territory and in the east Sherpa and Rai groups 
border Tamang areas. In addition Tamang have also migrated in sig-
nificant numbers to the Tarai, Nepal’s southern region and to Sikkim 
and Darjeeling in India. With a total number of 1,282,304 people, the 
Tamang constitute 5.6 percent of the total Nepalese population and 
hence form the fifth largest group in the country, if Chhetri and Bahun 
are listed as separate groups. However, other groups are frequently 
included as Tamang in the census and non-Tamang groups can come to 
be incorporated into the community over a period of time, which already 
reveals some problems in defining fixed boundaries of ethnic labels such 
as Tamang (Holmberg 2005, 1989: 20).9   
In the anthropological literature the Tamang are generally perceived 
as being composed of distinct groups, which moved across the border 
from Tibet in many successive waves of migration during the Ghorkali 
state formation. The term Tamang was not common in general official 
usage in Nepal until the twentieth century. In 1932 a government de-
cree declared that people formerly known as Bhote, Lama or Murmi 
were now officially named Tamang.10 Elder men from a Tamang commu-
nity northwest of the Kathmandu valley remember that roughly at the 
same time this government decree was promulgated, an official visited 
the village requiring all men to recognize a document stating they would 
no longer be called or call themselves Bhote or Lama, but Tamang. How-
ever Lama is still widely used for self-designation in the region (ibid.: 
17). Even though the term Tamang can be found in Tibetan texts dat-
ing back to the thirteenth century and the Tamang’s forefathers shared 
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a “minimal or latent identity, based on common cultural and linguistic 
criteria and on the awareness of a common, mostly mythically substan-
tiated origin” (Höfer 1979: 148), the extent to which the term was ap-
plied to, and used by, a particular group of people remains unclear. Thus 
as both written resources and oral accounts suggest the term Tamang 
as a label for a defined group lacks clarity, historical depth and tells little 
about the groups’ ethnic identity. 
Significantly, among themselves, Tamang apply their own categories 
to designate people within and outside their respective community. De-
spite the fact that the ethnic category Tamang subsumes western and 
eastern subgroups, western Tamang see no deeper connection to the 
easterners than they do to people known by the ethnic label Gurung. 
According to Campbell (2008, 1997: 206ff.), Tamangs living east of 
the Bhote Kosi River in Rasuwa district, which has the largest popula-
tion of Tamang in Nepal, are referred to as Shyarpa “east people” by 
the Tamang of the river’s western side, who are vice versa designated 
as Nuppa “west people” by those living eastwards of the river. Shyarpa 
consider Nuppa as more traditional, which is reflected for example, in 
their wearing of more traditional dress and differing song styles. Fur-
thermore for western Tamangs the label Shyarpa includes not only peo-
ple generally referred to as Tamang, but Sherpa communities as well. 
Within the community of eastern Tamangs, people distinguish between 
Tamang and Ghale, based on the former eating beef, and the latter 
having their own terms for “elder brother”, “elder sister”, “father” and 
“grandmother” and differing honorific expressions. In this specific local 
setting Gurungs and Bei also form part of the local community and share 
the same basic social and cultural structures. Therefore outsiders tend 
to apply the term Tamang to the whole community, whereas from an 
emic perspective this is incorrect.11 In the Helambu region a main social 
distinction within the Tamang community is made between Lama and 
Tamang; the former who are generally wealthier, present themselves as 
Sherpa to outsiders. As these regional emic accounts on ethnicity cat-
egories reveal, ethnicity and identity processes are much more complex 
than a single label suggests. A person can be linguistically Tamang, but 
denies this identity in terms of dietary rules, as it is the case for Ghale. 
Furthermore identities are context-dependent and subject to strategic 
use, illustrated by the fact that some Tamang choose to present them-
selves as Sherpa or Gurung outside their own community.
Thus, in terms of regional perspectives on ethnic identity it can be 
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argued that eastern and western Tamang are not conjoined into a com-
mon society. This can be partly explained by the social organization 
of the Tamang that focuses on a circle of kin restricted to a number 
of neighbouring villages. Villages are linked by the practice of recipro-
cal exchange being at the core of Tamang social life. Exchange is built 
around the opposition of patrilineal clans and their connection through 
bilateral cross-cousin marriage (Fricke 1988: 3). Reciprocal exchange 
is not merely a fact of social life, but embodies an orientation towards 
life. It therefore constitutes a cultural logic, which is reflected in Ta-
mang myth and rituals. However, the practice of cross-cousin marriage 
and the organisation of the community into patrilineal clans can also 
be observed among other groups in Nepal, especially those inhabiting 
the hill areas. The same is true for religion: Tamang practice a form of 
Buddhism closely related to that of other hill groups like Sherpa and Gu-
rung, which too finds it source in Tibetan Buddhism. Hence, social orga-
nization in patrilineal clans, cross-cousin marriage and the following of 
a certain form of Buddhism are not features unique to the Tamang and 
thus do not separate them from other groups. Assuming that language 
is another factor contributing to a group’s ethnic identity is similarly 
not successful in explaining the existence of a distinct Tamang ethnic 
identity. Western and eastern dialects differ to a large extent – in fact, 
both dialects are not closer to each other than to languages like Gurung, 
Thakali or Manangi, all of them belonging to the same language family 
(Glover cited in Holmberg 2005, 1989: 21)
Thus the contribution of a primordialist approach towards the study 
of ethnicity, that is the assumption that a stable core of features consti-
tutes a particular group’s ethnic identity, is limited in explaining the ex-
istence of a distinct Tamang ethnic identity. As Levine (1987: 75) points 
out, heterogeneity within and between primary named ethnic groups 
is characteristic in the Nepalese context. Campbell (2008, 1997: 222) 
shares Levine’s argument that being Tamang is of minor importance in 
social interactions. However, he puts into perspective the assumption 
that the label Tamang is of no meaning at all in a non-local context by 
stressing the possibility of establishing a relationship in terms of kinship 
when Tamang discover each other’s clan affiliation. As a result of the 
primordial approach’s limitations, in adopting a more instrumentalist 
approach, anthropologists suggest that the Nepalese state formation 
played an essential role in the creation of ethnic labels and identities. 
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As Holmberg puts it: 
“The Tamang as a named category of people…emerged not out of time immemo-
rial from hidden Himalayan valleys but with the formation of the state of Nepal 
(Holmberg 2005, 1989: 12).”
 
State Formation and it’s Role in the Creation of a Pan-Tamang 
Identity
State formation in Nepal was initiated through the military conquest 
of the Kathmandu valley in 1768 by King Prithvi Narayan Shah, ruler 
of the small principality Gorkha. In the following decades 60 formerly 
independent political units inhabited by diverse groups were brought 
under a central administration based in Kathmandu through conquest, 
negotiation and alliance and a feudal-like polity began to emerge. Fur-
ther expansion of the territory came to an end in 1816, when the Hima-
layan kingdom was defeated by the British East India Company and lost 
territories in Sikkim, Kumaon and Garhwal acquired by Prithvi Narayan 
Shah and his direct successors. The imposition of the Treaty of Sagauli 
in the same year was a crucial point in modern state-formation; end-
ing the expansion and fixing the southern boundary it gave Nepal an 
internationally recognised state territory and paved the way for further 
internal consolidation (Burghart 1984: 226). Already at the end of the 
eighteenth century Prithvi Narayan Shah provided a source defining Ne-
pal as a Hindu kingdom and consequently legitimized Hindu kingship in 
his Divya Upadesh: “[…] this will be a true Hindusthan of the four varna 
and thirty-six jat” (Stiller 1968: 44). By this formulation he included 
all people living in the conquered territory irrespective of their religion, 
caste or ethnic affiliation within the framework of Hinduism.12 Although 
the Hindu framework introduced by Prithvi Narayan Shah aimed to sub-
sume the various groups, it was the introduction of the legal code Mu-
luki Ain (MA) in 1854 by Jang Bahadur Rana which codified and fixed 
the status of all castes and ethnic communities within a legally binding 
national Hindu social hierarchy.13 
The 700-page legal code dealt with topics such as land tenure and 
law of inheritance, but most of the chapters were dedicated to intra- 
and inter-caste relations. In the MA all groups were equally called jat. 
The main distinction was between tagadhari “wearers of the holy cord” 
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who formed the elite of society and included Chetri, Bahun, Thakuri as 
well as several Newar castes, and matwali, the various alcohol consum-
ing jat. The matwali were further divided into non-enslavable and en-
slavable alcohol drinkers, impure but touchable and untouchable jat. All 
ethnic groups were classified as alcohol drinking, but pure jat, ranked 
between high and low Hindu castes depending on the degree of similar-
ity and differences they shared with the high caste Hindus. Laws, rights 
and duties were applied according to one’s status within the hierarchy 
and membership of a certain group contained economic and political 
significance.14 Hence the MA translated cultural differences into hierar-
chical caste categories based on Hindu notions of purity and pollution 
(Pfaff-Czarnecka 1999: 52; Pradhan 2002: 9).15 
When looking for a direct reference revealing the position of the 
Tamang within the legal code, one is confronted with the striking fact 
that the label does not appear at all. Tamang are subsumed under the 
category Bhote, which generally refers to Tibetan-speaking groups. In 
consequence Tamang are ranked within the category of masinya mat-
wali “enslavable alcohol-drinkers” and are not included in the group 
of namasinya matwali “non-enslavable alcohol-drinkers” like other hill 
ethnic groups such as Gurung and Magar. 
The low position assigned to the Tamang in the nascent state can be 
attributed to a combination of socio-economic and ideological factors. 
Tamangs inhabited and possessed lands adjacent to the Kathmandu 
valley, the centre of the new administration and ruling elites. In addi-
tion important trading routes between India and Tibet were situated in 
Tamang populated areas towards the north, which then were of crucial 
economic and strategic importance. Many Tamang lost their lands to 
high-caste Bahun and Chhetri immigrants through money lending, and 
land formerly used as pasture and forest was transformed into the im-
migrants’ private properties – in most cases with support of the Rana 
government. Almost all labour required by the government was per-
formed by Tamang due to their proximity to Kathmandu, even though 
compulsory labour was not limited to this area. The practice of rakam, 
regular compulsory labour obligations for the military’s and administra-
tion’s requirements in return for usufruct land, had a deep impact on 
villagers’ daily life and beyond. The threat of physical violence in the 
form of beating and the confiscation of their land by government of-
ficials if villagers failed to perform their duties or openly opposed the 
system was omnipresent (Holmberg et al. 1999: 75). As a consequence 
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Tamang migration was very limited, they were prevented from taking 
employment outside their settlement areas and from participating in 
trade and hence lacked experience outside the valley. Campbell (2008, 
1997: 224ff.) argues, that the monopolization of Tamang labour for 
state services was also the main reason for prohibiting recruitment from 
the districts adjacent to Kathmandu into the Gurkha army. Tamangs 
who wanted to sidestep this rule had to change their names in order to 
get enlisted. 
Labour in the formation of the Nepalese nation state thus carried 
symbolic power by enabling the elites to reproduce a dominant position 
over the people living within the territory. To a certain extent the history 
of state labour linked the perception of cultural differences to a division 
of labour. Tamang generally were excluded more than other groups from 
participation in the Hindu state and defined as people who labour. Cer-
tain Tamang communities assumed this state-ascribed identity – Camp-
bell reports that the Tamang term for load-carrying people is often used 
in rhetorical conversations to describe a fundamental economic identity 
defined by subordination. The employment of many Tamangs in today’s 
trekking industry can be interpreted as a continuing pattern: Tamang 
are still the ones carrying loads for the Kathmandu elites and are ex-
cluded from making profits (ibid.: 227). Nevertheless not all Tamangs 
work as porters and labour is only one fundamental aspect contributing 
to the self-perception of an individual or group.  
Besides the proximity to Kathmandu, according to Holmberg (1989: 
23f.) three factors contributed to the Hindu perception of the Tamang: 
they were perceived as consumers of beef, practitioners of Buddhism 
and as a subjugated population, all attributes being in opposition to the 
Hindu nascent state order. In fact, Bhote are the only group described 
as beef-eaters in the MA. Respect for the cow is an integral part of 
the Hindu social order and one criterion for the differentiation of social 
and religious groups. Until recently the importance of the cow was also 
reflected in its usage as an official symbol for the Hindu monarchy (Mi-
chaels 2008, 1997: 79-100). Therefore associations of Bhote-Tamang 
with violence against cows, which is in contrast to actual social Tamang 
practices, exaggerated their otherness and enforced their separation 
from Hindu society. Furthermore in practicing Buddhism and follow-
ing Lamas, Tamang recognized a competitive socio-religious order and 
might have enforced Rana fears of solidarity with Tibet rather than the 
new emerging state. This perception was further strengthened by the 
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proximity of Tamang territory in the North to Tibet and historical links 
of some Tamang polities to its neighbour. The combination of Tamang’s 
traditional settlement area around the Kathmandu valley and along the 
trading routes towards Tibet and their cultural practices which were 
perceived as opposing the Hindu social order contributed to their role as 
labourers in the feudal-like state and consequently led to their relatively 
low position in the MA. 
Being labelled Tamang by the administration of the newly emerging 
Nepalese state had far reaching political and legal consequences. It was 
of less relevance in the local and regional socio-cultural context, where 
Tamang continued applying their own terms to describe themselves and 
people within and outside their respective communities. The decision 
to introduce the term Tamang in differentiation to Bhote in 1932 was 
mainly motivated by the state’s desire to designate a larger proportion 
of its population as well-incorporated citizens and to prevent possible 
claims by Tibet over border areas. Except for Höfer (1979: 148), who 
argues Tamang possessed a latent shared identity prior to the state’s 
interventions most scholars agree that it has been the state introducing 
the label and attaching significance to it, which was primarily noticeable 
in administrative contexts. Foreign government officials like the Scot 
Francis Hamilton, who worked for the East India Company and visited 
Nepal in 1802, and later on non-Nepalese researchers made use of the 
labels provided by the state to facilitate communication between each 
other. Although the state tried to fix identities for its own purposes, indi-
viduals did not only endure this process, but applied creative strategies 
to get advantages in specific contexts, such as the use of ethnic labels 
by Tamang in order to be included on the recruiting lists of the Gurkha 
army shows. 
The emergence of Tamang as a label for a pan-group identity is thus 
directly linked to the formation of the Nepalese state. However, it is 
likely that people gradually started to accept state definitions. Greater 
mobility after the end of the Rana era when villagers started to openly 
oppose the rakam system brought together Tamang from diverse re-
gions. During the Panchayat regime Tamang began to organize them-
selves and new government policies as well as the intensified work of 
ethnic activists after 1990 contributed to the establishment of a pan-
Tamang identity. These post-1990 dynamics will be discussed in more 
detail below. If today’s ethnic identities are seen as new phenomena 
from an instrumentalist point of view, it is important to note, that at the 
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same time they are directly connected to the categories produced by 
the ideology of state formation (Holmberg et al. 1999: 67).  
A New Political and Legal Framework in Post-1990 Nepal 
The Jan Andolan of 1990, the first people’s movement brought about the 
restoration of a multi-party democracy after 30 years of the autocratic 
Panchayat system. During Panchayat rule the creation of a strong na-
tional identity i.e. a homogenising Nepali identity and culture in favour of 
the Parbatiya, the dominant high-caste Hindus of the hill region including 
Chhetri, Hill Bahun and Thakuri, became the ultimate goal and political 
ideology. Thus this period in Nepalese history can be described as a time 
of state-driven nation-building. The features chosen in order to achieve 
this goal were the Nepali language, Hinduism and the Hindu monarchy: 
“…the triumvirate of official Nepali national culture” (Onta 1996: 214).
Activism, the practice of campaigning to influence the world in line 
with an actively articulated programme, as defined by Gellner and Karki 
(2007: 363), can be traced back to the Rana era, but gained more 
importance during Panchayat times, even though it was massively re-
stricted. A number of ethnic and cultural organisations tried to preserve 
their identity vis-à-vis the dominant Parbatiya culture. They were al-
lowed to function as long as their agenda did not become too political. 
Especially since the mid-1970s the state was criticized more and more 
by ethnic activists due to its failures concerning the access to welfare 
and political participation for the majority of people and the socio-eco-
nomic development of the country. A decade later an increasing number 
of ethnic, religious and regional communities were creating a sphere 
of public protest where they addressed their critique and demands for 
state-restructuring and inclusion. The Jan Andolan, a united front of a 
wide spectrum of political parties, ethno-linguistic, regional and reli-
gious organizations, demanded the drafting of a new constitution that 
acknowledged the diversity of Nepal’s population and the restoration of 
multi-party democracy. In the spring of 1990, after several months of 
demonstrations and street battles, King Birendra was forced to legalise 
political parties again and allow the drafting of the constitution.
The 1990 constitution was awaited with high expectations by mem-
bers of historically subordinated groups including janajati, Dalit, region-
al, religious groups and women. The new constitution defined Nepal as a 
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constitutional monarchy. The Preamble of the constitution assigned sov-
ereignty from the king to the people, thus the constitution recognized 
a symbolic shift from passive subjects to active citizens. Article 4 (1) 
defined Nepal as a “multiethnic, multilingual, democratic, independent, 
indivisible, sovereign, Hindu and Constitutional Monarchical Kingdom.” 
Even though the terms “multiethnic”, “multilingual” and “democratic” 
were entirely new and recognised the cultural diversity to some extent, 
Nepal remained a Hindu monarchy. Furthermore Article 27 (1) clearly 
ascribed the legitimacy of the king to the fact that he is a descendant of 
“the Great King Prithvi Narayan Shah and an adherent of Aryan Culture 
and the Hindu Religion”. This article apparently reinforced narratives of 
the Panchayat era. Nepali was again privileged and declared to be the 
language of the nation and official language, while all languages spoken 
as mother tongues were ascribed the status of national languages (Arti-
cle 6). The constitution introduced various fundamental rights including 
the right to equality irrespective of religion, race, gender, caste, tribe 
or ideology (Article 11 (3)) right to property (Article 16) and the right 
to preserve and promote one’s language, script and cultures, and to 
educate children in their mother tongue (Article 18). However the right 
to religion was limited, since in Article 19 (1) conversion was banned.
Thus the constitution provided a legal framework allowing a new level of 
political freedom and hence political parties, non-governmental, social 
and ethnic organizations proliferated. The provisions made in the con-
stitution and the new form of government opened the possibility for a 
shift in the interpretation of symbols and also contained a commitment 
to respond to demands raised by the state’s citizens. In contrast to the 
democratic innovation, the definition of Nepal as a Hindu kingdom, the 
privileging of Nepali language and the limitation to the right of religion 
favouring Hinduism caused disappointment among members of the Jan 
Andolan, since they symbolized the continuing dominant influence of 
high-caste Parbatiyas. In addition the persistent inequality in terms of 
minority representation in government bodies and political parties, as 
well as the differing results concerning Human Development for differ-
ent ethnic and caste groups in sectors such as life expectancy, literacy 
rate and years of schooling, provided a basis for further activism that 
lead to further extensive political changes in the recent history of the 
country.16 The shifts Nepal experienced in the transitional phase be-
tween the 1990s and 2000s are summarized by Hachhetu (2003: 244) 
as follows: a shift from mono-cultural to multicultural nationalism, from 
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majoritarian to consensual democracy, the breaking of major traditional 
perceptions of nationalism and the building of new values and systems 
for national integration.
IPOs, NEFIN and Ethnic Parties – Ethnic Organizations in Nepal 
The political and constitutional framework provided after 1990 further 
opened the possibility for and encouraged more groups to enter the 
discourse on ethnicity, identity and equality even though activism con-
cerned with group identities did exist before 1990. However, the new 
political and legal framework led to an unprecedented rise of organiza-
tions of all shades. 
Susan Hangen (2010: 38f.) proposes the following classification of 
main organization types within the janajati movement: social organi-
zations representing single ethnic groups known by the name Indig-
enous People’s organizations (IPOs) in reference to the international 
discourse, federations of these organizations within and across ethnic 
boundaries with the Nepal Adivasi Janajati Mahasang, the National 
Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN), as the main represen-
tative of janajati issues at the national level, professional organiza-
tions for janajati journalists and lawyers and ethnic political parties.17 
No systematic survey exists so far about the exact number of IPOs, 
however there has been a dramatic growth of organizations at the na-
tional and international levels between 2006 and 2009 (Lama-Tamang 
2010: 19).18 Estimates suggests that the number of these organiza-
tions adds up to several hundred, whereby all larger janajati groups 
including Tamang, Magar, Newar and Gurung, have major organiza-
tions with established branches in districts all over the country. Due to 
their autonomous radius of operation they can be counted as separate 
organizations, increasing the total number of organizations even fur-
ther. A growing number of IPOs also managed to establish partner 
organizations around the globe within the last decade. 
The activities and programmes run by the IPOs are diverse. The 
promotion of janajati identity includes the celebration of festivals, birth 
anniversaries of historical figures, holding of literary programmes and 
sanskritik karyakram, cultural programmes. The latter aim to present 
the identity of a group through the performance of their assumed tra-
ditional dances, songs and the wearing of traditional dresses. Further-
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more by promoting a certain set of festivals and denying others, such as 
Dashain, a major Hindu festival closely linked to the former monarchy 
and seen as a symbol of oppression, subordination and enforced accul-
turation, IPOs aim to shift the meaning of long-standing traditions and 
symbols.19 Rights awareness activities regarding language, religion and 
mother tongue education and the publication of magazines, newspa-
pers and history books, which reinterpreted and challenge the dominant 
historical discourse are other activities of IPOs. Research and propaga-
tion of history, culture, language and literature are closely interrelated 
to this effort. Further programmes run by IPOs include the promotion 
of lawyers’, journalists’, women’s and students’ professional rights, in-
come generating activities and social services. By challenging the for-
mer state’s promotion of a homogenized Nepali identity on the basis of 
Parbatiya culture, IPOs’ actions and programmes have a clear political 
dimension, even though they primarily aim to revitalize culture and to 
preserve ethnic group’s identity. 
The success of the adivasi janajati movement can at least be partly 
traced back to its strong and visible presentation at the national level 
by the umbrella organisation NEFIN. NEFIN, at that time known by the 
name NEFEN, was founded in 1990 by seven member organisations 
and has currently 54 member organizations on the basis of a “one or-
ganization for each ethnic group”-policy, thus encouraging the forma-
tion of new ethnic organizations.20 However, the current policy of having 
one representing organization for each group brings up the question on 
which basis this representing body is chosen and whether it represents 
the entire respective ethnic group. At the beginning mainly founded 
to coordinate the activities of its member organizations, NEFIN soon 
developed into a strong force uniting the adivasi janajati voice at the 
national level, formulating the aims and demands of the movement, 
pressuring the government, political parties and international agencies 
and binding the Nepali movement to the international discourse. Since 
1992 NEFIN annually issues a declaration addressing the demands of 
indigenous people. In its early years NEFIN was mostly concerned with 
the construction of a collective identity for Nepal’s ethnic groups, hence 
establishing Nepal’s ethnic groups under a united label as a legal politi-
cal actor. Since no ethnic group constitutes more than 7.1 percent of the 
total population, it is more likely that they can pressure the government 
as a united group and enforce their demands. NEFIN’s operating prin-
ciples underwent a major shift after 2002. Before that NEFIN worked 
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primarily as a pressure group trying to influence political parties and 
the government. Later on it adopted more radical methods of political 
protests as their participation in street rallies, marches and demonstra-
tions during the second Jan Andolan in April 2006 for the restoration of 
democracy after the royal take overs in 2002 and 2005 shows. Currently 
NEFIN is implementing, coordinating and monitoring programmes for 
the development of adivasi janajati under the Janajati Empowerment 
Programme (JEP) for which it received financial support from foreign 
donor governments. The acceptance of NEFIN as the representative of 
Nepal’s ethnic groups by the government is furthermore reflected in the 
fact that in 2007 NEFIN and the interim government signed a 20-point 
agreement about the establishment of proportional representation 
based on ethnicity in the Constituent Assembly (CA).21 
In contrast to IPOs and NEFIN, ethnic based political parties try to 
seek direct political power to improve the situation of janajati. They 
are headed by leaders, who are frustrated with the exclusionary selec-
tion processes of mainstream political parties, which did not manage to 
give janajati issues a significant place in their election manifestos and 
failed to improve the situation of ethnic groups in Nepal (Hangen 2010: 
44). Ethnic political parties aim to make the government more repre-
sentative and responsive towards ethnic demands. Both their agendas 
and aspirations for direct political power locate them in a more radical 
spectrum of activism even so they operate in the democratic context 
provided by the state in contrast to armed forces e.g. liberation fronts.22 
Ethnic territorial self-representation and the right to self-determination 
is a core issue for ethnic political parties. With the experience of failed 
decentralization in the 1990s they argue ethnic territories are a way to 
acquire a higher level of independence from the central administration 
by ensuring access to political participation for marginalized groups at 
the same time. Ethnic political parties still have a marginal position 
within the adivasi janajati movement, although their participation in the 
elections increased from two parties in the 1990 election to eleven in 
the Constituent Assembly Elections 2008.
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Adivasi Janajati – A Definition Exercise 
The construction of a collective identity vis-à-vis the dominant Parbatiya 
culture was one of NEFIN’s main objectives during its early years. The 
right to negotiate a new identity for Nepal’s ethnic groups was facilitated 
through the democratic framework provided after 1990. The emergence 
of and the campaigning for the term adivasi janajati thereby reflects the 
changed political climate in Nepal as well as the linkage of the move-
ment to regional and international discourses on ethnicity. Concerned 
activists adopted the term janajati at the end of the Panchayat era from 
Darjeeling Nepali which itself introduced the term from Bengali where 
it already was in frequent use to refer to “tribal” groups. NEFIN started 
to promote the term just after its foundation in 1990. NEFIN and most 
adivasi janajati organizations favour “nationalities” as the English trans-
lation for janajati, which indicates a strong political agenda, since the 
term “nationalities” bears association with claims over territory in Eng-
lish. From an anthropological perspective the term janajati subsumes 
groups formerly known by the label “ethnic group”, which itself is a 
problematic term as discussed above. In the Nepali context it can be 
traced back to the category matwali, the alcohol drinking jat in the MA, 
which consisted predominantly of ethnic groups.      
During the 1990s the janajati movement developed stronger ties 
with the international movement on the rights for indigenous people, 
which gained more prominence throughout the world when the United 
Nations declared a Year of Indigenous People in 1993 and afterwards 
extended it to a decade. Parshuram Tamang was elected to the Council 
of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2002, 
NEFIN and IPOs started to send delegates to the annual forum of the UN 
in New York and as a result networking with similar movements all over 
the world became an important feature of adivasi janajati actions. The 
amendment from Nepal Federation of Nationalities (NEFEN) to Nepal 
Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) in 2003 by adding the 
local term adivasi to the organization’s name reflects the international-
ization of the movement. While the opposition towards high-caste Hin-
dus was the main identity marker of janajati groups during the 1990s, 
the influence of the international indigenous movement brought about 
a shift towards stressing the indigenousness of Nepal’s ethnic groups 
by ignoring the fact, that most ethnic groups of Nepal have myths of 
origins towards the South and North. Consequently the verifiability of 
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claims highlighting the indigenousness of Nepal’s group from a scholarly 
perspective is highly doubtful. Therefore it reveals political rather than 
scientific factors for a shift in the terminology.    
In 1996 the Nepalese government responded to the adivasi janajati 
movement’s claim to recognize its constructed pan-identity by accept-
ing a Task Force Report recommending a list of 61 janajatis and the 
installation of a national foundation for Nepal’s ethnic groups.23 Conse-
quently a National Committee for the Development of Nationalities was 
founded and in 2002 with the passing of the National Foundation for 
Development of Indigenous Nationalities Act (NFDIN), Nepal got its first 
government institution concerned with adivasi janajati issues. This step 
constituted an important caesura in the history of Nepal and a much-
acclaimed success for NEFIN and the movement as a whole. The Minis-
try of Law, Social Justice and Parliamentary Affairs confirmed a final list 
of 59 adivasi janajati of Nepal on the basis of the following definition: 
“‘Indigenous Nationalities’ means a tribe or community as mentioned in the 
schedule having its own mother language and traditional rites and customs, dis-
tinct cultural identity, distinct social structure and written and unwritten history” 
(NFDIN 2003: 7).24 
This definition differs from the features submitted by the Task Force 
Report, as that janajati adivasi are not necessarily outside the fourfold 
Hindu Varna, which might have been too radical for a government Act. 
Both, the definition provided in the Act and the Task Force Report Com-
mittee’s definition classify janajati adivasi on the basis of certain features 
being in accordance with the primordial view on ethnicity. Yet Dalits and 
certain Madhesis groups, who live in the Tarai region and have strong 
linkages to India, are excluded from becoming members in NFDIN on 
the basis of their assumed Hindu identity, even though Dalits are outside 
the fourfold Hindu varna system. Resources are denied for those groups, 
irrespective of the fact, that Dalits and janajati shared a similar agenda 
during the Jan Andolan: questioning a political climate denying the rec-
ognition of its citizens’ cultural differences and limiting participation in 
the state and access to resources to a few privileged groups. Dalits, who 
constitute about 8.7 percent of the Nepalese population and belong to 
the most disadvantaged groups in the country, are facing difficulties in 
mobilizing resources and support from international donors since they 
cannot draw on a well-established international discourse. 
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Out of the 59 recognized groups 18 are from the mountain region, 
24 from the hills, 7 from the Inner Tarai and 10 from the Tarai. Only 43 
among the 59 groups were enlisted in the 2001 Census, according to 
which adivasi janajati account for 36.4 percent of the total population. 
Due to the missing 11 groups, NFDIN estimates that the total num-
ber of indigenous nationalities constitutes 42 percent (NFDIN 2003: 3). 
The government’s definition, even though a success for the movement, 
was at the same time exposed to critique from activists and scholars. 
One point of criticism regarding the undifferentiated picture provided in 
the government schedule about the 59 groups’ socio-economic status 
led to a further classification into the categories of endangered, highly 
marginalized, marginalized, disadvantaged and advanced groups.25 The 
Tamang were classified as a marginalized group like the majority of 
adivasi janajati. This classification now forms the basis for programmes 
developed by the government and NEFIN. 
This fact illustrates, that today the term adivasi janajati is widely 
accepted as a legal category that unites diverse heterogeneous groups 
into a single overarching community on the basis of cultural features, 
which are opposed to high-caste Hindus and closely connected to the 
international discourse on the rights of indigenous people. Therefore 
these developments provide an example for human agency and cre-
ativity in the negotiation and construction of identity and ethnicity.26 
Labelling an ethnic group adivasi janajati today means participating in 
an international recognized and positive received discourse and hav-
ing access to political and economic resources for the development of 
the respective group. A former derogative identity label perceived as 
threat to national unity and associated with backwardness changed its 
meaning during the 1990s and is now desirable. Therefore more groups 
might be encouraged to file a petition for the recognition in the gov-
ernment schedule in order to benefit from the label, what is perceived 
as a positive development by actors such as NEFIN but might lead to 
struggles over limited resources. Another discourse might arise about 
the question whether all janajati are automatically adivasi or if a fur-
ther differentiation is necessary. This could possibly lead to a weaken-
ing of the movement. 
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Tamang Activism – An Overview 
Tamang organizations can trace their roots back to the 1950s, when 
Tamang activists where involved in the revolution of 1950-1951, which 
overturned the Rana regime. In 1956 the first Tamang Committee was 
formed, however the term Tamang was not in usage in organizing fo-
rums till the end of the Panchayat era, which might be explained by 
the autocratic climate that was critical to any activism especially when 
based on ethnic affiliation. During Panchayat rule Tamang organizations 
had to operate in the underground and were mostly concerned with the 
preservation of culture and language (Tamang interviewed by Krämer 
1995: 42). After the 1990-movement, a new generation of Tamang 
activists was enabled to apply a more radical political vocabulary and 
openly questioned the power relations in Nepal. Since the end of the 
1990s claims over territory and the struggle for group rights have be-
came more important features in accordance with the overall political 
climate created by the adivasi janajati movement as a whole. 
Most Tamang actors and organizations within the janajati adivasi 
movement can be described as what Onta (2006: 303) calls “non-po-
litical institutional agents” by which he means entities that are not 
directly linked with political parties and governments. “Non-political 
institutional agents” include janajati adivasi organizations, media and 
academia. Today the Tamang have about 25 organizations in the Kath-
mandu valley alone among which the Nepal Tamang Ghedung (NTG) 
is the largest and most influential one. Hence Tamang belong to the 
well-organized adivasi janajati like other major groups such as Magar, 
Gurung and Newar. The mainstream Tamang movement is dedicated to 
a peaceful struggle within the democratic framework provided in post-
1990 Nepal.27 In addition Tamang managed to establish organizations 
around the world, a process that intensified since the end of the 1990s. 
Tamang organizations in Australia, the UK, Bhutan, China (Hong Kong), 
India, Myanmar, Thailand and the USA raise funds, promote Tamang 
culture among the Diaspora community and build a bridge between the 
international Tamang community and the adivasi janajati movement in 
Nepal. Furthermore Tamang activists discovered the World Wide Web, 
as a useful tool for advancing their cause and reaching a wide Tamang 
and non-Tamang audience. 
Tamang are by comparison well-presented and active in radio and 
TV. In 2005 about 10 FM broadcast stations were offering programmes 
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in Tamang and 40 Tamang individuals where involved in the production 
of programmes in Tamang language. According to Pratik Tamang (cited 
in Onta 2006: 339) these radio programmes have been an inspiration 
for the younger generation to write literature, create songs and music 
in their own language. Thus they contribute to the creation of a new 
Tamang identity of which people can be proud. Surprisingly most pro-
ductions are done on a voluntary basis and lack support from the major 
organizations. Due to the limited access to mainstream print media, 
activist started to publish a number of irregular publications spread-
ing various views in the public sphere. Since the Tamang Media Group 
(TMG) was founded in 2004, Tamang have a professional actor who is 
dedicated to enhancing Tamang media personnel’s qualifications and 
skills through organizing various training and discussion programmes 
and bringing together Tamang communicators and strengthening the 
voice of the Tamang community.
Parshuram Tamang – A Central Personality for the Tamang 
Movement 
The leadership of the janajati adivasi movement is for the most part in 
the hands of male urban intellectuals with a university background.28 
Parshuram Tamang, professor for economics at Tribhuvan University, is 
a central figure for Tamang activism and the movement as a whole. He 
was among the individuals pushing forward the foundation of NEFEN in 
1990 and served as the organization’s general secretary between 1996 
and 2000. At the national level Parshuram Tamang is active in the Indig-
enous Nationalities’ Campaign for Human Rights and is a core member 
of the Environmental Coalition of Indigenous People’s Organisations of 
Nepal. He functioned as the president of the Nepal Tamang Ghedung 
till 2008 now serving as their chief advisor and is chairman of the In-
ternational Tamang Council, which among other things brings together 
Tamang from various regions for Conferences. Parshuram Tamang also 
works in several government initiatives concerned with the rights and 
development for adivasi janati. For example, he was a selected member 
of the influential committee for advising Radio Nepal on multilingual 
broadcasting. Furthermore he published several articles and conference 
papers on Tamang and adivasi janajati issues in national and interna-
tional magazines and newspapers. In 2008 Parshuram Tamang founded 
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the first Tamang ethnic political party, the Tamsaling Rastriya Nepal Dal 
who ran in the CA elections 2008.
One of Parshuram Tamang’s main objectives has always been the 
establishment of links between the adivasi janajati movement in Nepal 
and the international sphere concerned with indigenous people. He was 
an elected member in the Council of the United Nations Permanent Fo-
rum in Indigenous People in 2002 by the Asia Regional Indigenous Con-
ference for a three-year basis and got re-elected in 2005 for another 
time in office. In addition he served as an executive member for the 
Asia Indigenous People’s Pact between 1996 and 2000, a regional Asian 
organization and was executive secretary for the International Alliance’s 
secretary based in London from 2000 to 2002. Furthermore he is a 
coordinating member for the International Alliance of Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests, a worldwide network of organisa-
tions representing indigenous and tribal peoples living in tropical forest 
regions. Members of NEFIN criticized his leadership style and penchant 
for the international networking route while Tamang was acting as the 
organization’s general secretary. Their fears that issues at home might 
languish got partly confirmed when NEFIN failed to hold a regular gen-
eral assembly in 1998. Despite this criticism Parshuram Tamang is a 
well-known representative and expert for adivasi janati issues and has 
developed strong ties with the international discourse on Indigenous 
People and human rights of minorities. He is involved in a number of 
Tamang organizations and represents the Tamang as a whole on the 
national and international level.
I want to highlight two critical points concerning ethnic leadership 
that are applicable for the movement as a whole. First as already men-
tioned, the majority of ethnic leaders are well-educated and based in 
urban areas. With a university background and as a member of a cer-
tain group, they have a double legitimacy in speaking for their respec-
tive group. Therefore the discourse produced by ethnic group’s thinkers 
answers certain demands. Consequently their statements have to be 
examined carefully in this context and should not be taken as mere 
facts. The second important question that arises within the framework 
of adivasi janati-activism is “Who speaks for whom?” As intellectuals 
and scholars who at the same time often have international linkages 
ethnic leaders have the knowledge and the tools to define and lead the 
discourse, possibly at the expense of other voices and interpretations 
within their ethnic group. In addition the majority of “ordinary” people 
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in Nepal are occupied with daily needs and economic survival, thus is-
sues such as ethnicity, identity and demands arising from the ethnic 
movement do not constitute a major part in their lives. The agenda 
activists promote is therefore not necessarily shared by most of the 
people it aims to represent. Ethnic leaders’ statements have to be com-
pared to and enhanced by views of other members of the respective 
group in order to get a more accurate picture of the discourses.  
Nepal Tamang Ghedung – Advocating Tamang as an Ethnic 
Group 
The NTG is an autonomous non-profit organization that aims to speak 
for “the whole Tamang people” (Tamang interviewed by Krämer 1994: 
41) and represents the group in NEFIN. Ghedung is a Tamang word and 
means association or organization. Thus the Nepal Tamang Ghedung 
is the association of Nepal’s Tamang – the claim to act for all Tamang 
is hence already reflected in the organization’s name. The NTG was 
reorganized in 1988 and traces its roots back to 1956 when the first 
Tamang Committee was founded. Today the organization has district 
committees in 62 out of 75 Nepalese districts and in addition 500 village 
level committees. The expansion took place mainly between 1990 and 
1995 in order to connect urban activists and the rural Tamang popula-
tion (Lama-Tamang 2009: 284). It was accompanied by activities such 
as Lhochhar and Buddha’s anniversary, Sanskritik Karyakram and the 
boycott of Dashain.
The aims of the NTG are presented as follows on their homepage: 
First, the preservation and promotion of the language, script, arts, 
skill, literature, history, religion and cultural, and social, economic, 
political and civil rights of the Tamang people. Second, the promotion 
of human rights, women’s, children’s and indigenous people’s rights 
on the basis of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Bill of Rights, 
and emerging rights in the international arena. Third, the creation of 
awareness about the constitutional and legal systems and the pro-
motion of democratic rights. Fourth, contribution to the national and 
international standard setting processes for the establishment of the 
rights of indigenous and tribal peoples and marginalized communities 
who are historically victims of racial, ethnic or national, linguistic, re-
ligious and regional discrimination. And fifth, developing and promot-
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ing friendly relations and partnerships with other ethnic communities 
to strengthen the national unity and all round development of the 
country and to network with the national and international organiza-
tions of similar objectives. Noticeable about this list is the internation-
al rhetoric and cross-references made to the international discourse. 
The NTG locates its aims within the framework of international human 
rights and the rights for indigenous people, an orientation that most 
likely was promoted by Parshuram Tamang, who was the NTG’s presi-
dent till 2008 – already in 1994 he stressed the fact that all concerns 
of the organization are within the scope of human rights (Tamang 
interviewed by Krämer 1994: 42). 
From the Nepal Tamang Ghedungs’ self-conception and its aims, 
two interrelated questions result: In which ways does the organisation 
define Tamang as a distinct ethnic group and how does the NTG justify 
and explain its claim to represent all Tamang of Nepal?  From an an-
thropological perspective it is doubtful that the Tamang form a single 
ethnic group, a point of view clearly opposed by Tamang ethnic think-
ers. Therefore the discourse on Tamang identity led by Tamang activ-
ists is embedded in a process of reinterpreting history and highlighting 
certain aspects which are assumed to be features constituting ethnic 
identity and bear importance for the struggle over resources whereas 
other features, which might contradict a distinct Tamang ethnic iden-
tity, are neglected.  
Parshuram Tamang asserts that the Tamang form an ethnic group 
or even stronger a “nation” by stating: “Tamangs have their own lan-
guage, their unique lifestyle and religious beliefs” (Tamang 1992b: 
25). The emphasis on language is particularly interesting since schol-
ars generally agree that Tamang consists of various dialects which are 
mutually incomprehensible and resemble the same degree of similar-
ity between each other as to languages such as Gurung and Thakali. 
When asked by Krämer about western scholars’ assumption that the 
Tamang label comprises a number of different groups most visible by 
the autonomous status of languages spoken by the groups, Parshuram 
Tamang answered, “…there is only one language” (Tamang interviewed 
by Krämer 1994: 47), which he admits consists of different dialects. 
Furthermore, Parshuram Tamang concludes that a common language, 
which all Tamang “…should be able to call […] their own” (ibid.) needs 
to be developed and cultivated. 
This argument and the stress on language development are in line 
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with the emphasis on language stressed in the 1990-constitution. Ne-
pal was defined as “multi-lingual” (Article 4 (1)), mother tongues were 
ascribed the status of national languages (Article 6) and mother tongue 
education was guaranteed (Article 18). With the introduction of new 
language policies and programmes, for example the attempt to broad-
cast in various adivasi janajati languages on Radio Nepal, the struggle 
over resources began.29 The government classified four categories of 
language development: most developed languages, languages in the 
process of developing a written tradition, languages without a written 
tradition and dying languages. In a second step a three-phase action 
plan for the implementation of mother-tongue instruction in school was 
defined. It is remarkable that Tamang, a language without a written 
tradition till the early 1990s managed to develop a variety of language 
materials including newspapers, magazines, journals, learning materi-
als, literacy materials, literature, poems, plays, fiction, folk songs and 
films by 2007.30 Tamang today is most of the time written in the Deva-
nagari script. However, in 1994 Parshuram Tamang claimed Tamang 
should be written in Tibetan to depict the sounds properly since the 
language is closer to Tibetan than South-Asian language such as Nepali. 
Interestingly this is followed by the assertion that using the Tibetan 
script would also fit with the Tamang’s ‘religious tradition’ (ibid.: 47). 
In doing so, it becomes clear, that his consideration is not only with the 
language itself, but contains a political statement as well: the distance 
of Tamang culture and tradition to the dominant Parbatiya culture which 
is and especially was a common ground to unite on during the 1990s 
when NEFIN and other IPOs highlighted cultural aspects differentiating 
them from high-caste Hindus. Similarly his views about the equality of 
men and women in Tamang society are a point of further distinction 
between Tamang and Parbatiya society. However he also states that 
equality has deteriorated with the influence of Hindu cultural values. A 
lack of equality on the organisational level becomes obvious, when tak-
ing into account the low number of women representatives in Tamang 
organisations, as it is true for the representation of women for adivasi 
janajati as a whole. 
Another point closely connected to language issues is the definition 
of the Tamang community’s boundaries. While according to the 2001 
Census Tamang constitute 5.6 percent of the total Nepalese population, 
in 1992 Parshuram Tamang suggested a total number of 18 to 20 per-
cent (Tamang 1992b: 27). Notwithstanding that the first Census data 
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on ethnicity were only produced in 1991, this high number might not 
entirely be a consequence of a lack of data, but might result from politi-
cal considerations. Sonntag (1995: 115) notes the tendency of some 
Tamang language strategists to define Tamang as an umbrella language 
for several Tibeto-Burman languages including among others Gurung 
and Thakali. By imposing their language on other Tibeto-Burman speak-
ing groups they might seek to incorporate more people into the Tamang 
community to legitimate claims over resources. Simultaneously the 
practice of some communities in Nepal’s north to identify themselves as 
Tamang in particular contexts, serves Tamang ethnic activist’s purposes 
to subsume those groups under the Tamang label. 
The reinterpretation of historical events to create a continuous 
shared history for all Tamang is another important part of the ethnic 
argument generated by activists. In Parshuram Tamang’s historical ac-
count the Tamang have a common origin and today’s differences in lan-
guage and customs are only a result of the geographical distribution of 
Tamang settlements. With reference to Lichhavi inscriptions, Parshuram 
Tamang presents a theory that Tamang might be the earliest immi-
grants to Nepal. This assumption is particularly important for claims of 
indigenousness and hence for justifying the adivasi status of Tamang. 
Thus, Parshuram Tamang counters arguments by western scholars, who 
agree that the arrival of the first migration wave of Tamang happened 
in the 11th century. In short according to Parshuram Tamang, since the 
arrival of the Lichhavi the history of the Tamang has been characterised 
by exploitation and destruction of traditional culture (Tamang 1992a: 
45). Parshuram Tamang sees the issuing of the official government de-
cree in 1932, which officially introduced the term Tamang as an admin-
istrative category as a consequence of Tamang demands. Finally the 
Tamang gained the right to call themselves and be called by their proper 
name (Tamang interviewed by Krämer 1994: 47). The interpretation 
of this event as an answer to Tamang demands shifts the reasons for 
the recognition of the label Tamang from a state-driven administrative 
necessity serving the state’s own interests to an emphasise on Tamang 
agency. Whether or not the decree took Tamang claims into account, it 
most probably must have been a minority of Tamang who campaigned 
for the recognition of the label. 
The argumentation of the NTG answers to certain needs of the group 
and response to the adivasi janajati discourse as well as government 
policies as the examination of language issues and the reinterpreta-
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tion of history above reveals. Throughout the 1990s one of the main 
objectives was to establish the Tamang as a distinct ethnic group like 
NEFIN aimed to install adivasi janajati as a legal category. By high-
lighting Tamang’s distinct religion, customs and language, Parshuram 
Tamang applies primordial features to constitute the group’s identity. 
Historical events which western scholars use in their argumentation as 
evidence for the state’s influence in creating a pan-Tamang identity are 
reinterpreted by Tamang. He stresses the exploitation and its conse-
quences from which demands for compensation result, yet he reduces 
the administration’s role in the formation of a Tamang identity as his 
comments on the 1932 decree shows. With the introduction of a new 
language policy the need to create a shared Tamang language gained 
more importance and might have enabled the incorporation of smaller 
groups into the Tamang fold. Thus the identity discourse pushed for-
ward by ethnic activists and their respective organizations might con-
tribute to a homogenization of people’s identity for example by defining 
a certain set of language features as the single Tamang language. By 
reinterpreting national historiography activists offer a counter version to 
the dominant state discourse; however the question remains how far it 
reflects the oral history, experiences and opinions of all members of the 
community they claim to represent. 
Tamsaling Nepal Rastriya Dal and the Claim for Ethnic 
Territories
Like other ethnic political parties, the TRD was founded prior to the CA 
elections in 2008, since civil society organizations were not allowed to 
participate and ethnic activists feared their demands would weigh little 
in the drafting of a new constitution without a proper representation. 
The party, headed by Parshuram Tamang won 20,657 votes. Thus out 
of the eleven ethnic based parties it was one of the two parties, which 
did not get a seat in the CA. However, it would fall short to measure the 
success of ethnic parties solely on their election results. Ethnic politi-
cal parties challenge the dominant discourse by speeches and writings, 
they aim to raise the participation of ethnic groups in elections and gov-
ernment bodies and they carry out cultural events that advance political 
ideas (Hangen 2010: 17).
The term Tamsaling in the party’s name refers to the Tamang’s an-
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cestral homeland. Thus the party is mainly concerned with Tamang, 
even though according to the party manifesto it aims to represent all 
adivasi janajati groups. Today several organisations and political par-
ties are involved in the Joint Struggle Committee for Tamsaling, among 
them are the TRD and the NTG. The first political usage of the term 
Tamsaling, which means “the land of the Tamang” dates back to the 
late 1980s when the Tamba- Sa- Ling Mukti Morcha, (“the land of the 
Tamang’s Liberation Front”) was founded (Lama-Tamang 2009: 271). 
Later on the name was changed to Tamsaling by the NTG. The Federal 
Democratic National Front (FDNF), which got two seats in the CA elec-
tions, set up the “Tamsaling Autonomous State Council” in 2006. Two 
years earlier the Maoists had declared Tamsaling as one of the nine au-
tonomous regions that should be set up in the future republic of Nepal. 
The Tamsaling territory includes approximately nine out of Nepal’s 75 
current administrative districts.  
Parshuram Tamang’s approach towards ethnic territories has 
changed over the years. While in the early 1990s he was arguing for a 
cantonal approach, recently he was suggesting to take into account a 
group’s ancestral homeland. This means the majority group of a par-
ticular region would get a guaranteed shared of 51 percent in the re-
gional legislature while smaller groups would get a share most likely 
based on their group size. Later on Tamang put these statements into 
perspective by highlighting that the details are still in the process of 
consideration (Gellner et al. 1998: xxxv, xii). Like in the discourse on 
identity, Parshuram Tamang and other ethnic activists re-read national 
history in order to support their claims for Tamsaling. According to the 
activists after the Gorkha conquest of Tamang territory at the end of 
the eighteenth century, Tamang policies were dissolved. Consequently 
the new rulers expropriated Tamang land and gave it to Bahun and 
Chhetri migrants. Tamang were displaced from their ancestral lands. 
Under Rana rule the Tamang had to perform compulsory labour and 
experienced a common suffering.  
The issue of ethnic territorial autonomy is central to the demands of 
ethnic parties and has also become an important claim for most IPOs.31 
While the CA is working on a new constitution and the restructuring of 
the country into a federal state, it is highly debated on which factors the 
division of the country should be based on. Given the ethnic diversity 
in Nepal, the variation in group size and the spread settlement areas of 
the Nepalese population it seems impossible to implement ethnic units, 
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without privileging certain groups among others. Another question con-
cerns the consequences of a right to “self-determination”. In English the 
term usually includes the right of secession, what according to Gellner 
et al. (2008: xxxv) most activists in Nepal do not include in their under-
standing of the concept. Although many questions regarding ethnic ter-
ritories are still being debated, the CA will be measured to a large part 
on its success in establishing a federal state on lines acceptable to all. 
Conclusion 
In this article I have argued that the post-1990 developments in Nepal 
provide one example for what Bank describes as the entering of the 
academic concept ethnicity into the public and political sphere. Ena-
bled by the post-1990 legal framework and a new political climate in 
which disadvantages based on one’s belonging to a particular ethnic 
category could be addressed, the adivasi janajati movement under the 
strong leadership of NEFIN campaigned for the recognition of adivasi 
janajati as a legally valid category. While in the early 1990s the com-
mon ground to unite various heterogeneous groups into a single identity 
was their assumed cultural opposition to dominant high-caste Hindus, 
the discourse shifted later towards the stress of indigenousness, which 
was inspired by the growing internationalization of the adivasi janajati 
movement and a global emphasize on indigenousness initiated by the 
UN proclamation of a Year and subsequently a Decade of Indigenous 
People in 1993. Hence the movement was creatively ignoring the fact, 
that most of Nepal’s ethnic groups trace their myths of origins back 
towards the South or North. The establishment of NFDIN was an impor-
tant success for the movement since the government, applying a pri-
mordial definition of ethnicity, officially recognized the category adivasi 
janajati as the basis for the implementation of programmes. However, 
other disadvantaged groups like Dalits and Madhesis are excluded from 
becoming members in NEFIN due to their assumed Hindu identity. 
The categories produced within the adivasi janajati movement are 
directly linked with the state formation as it has been shown for the 
Tamang. The proximity of their settlements to Kathmandu, the cen-
tre of the newly emerging state and the practicing of beef-eating and 
Buddhism contributed to their otherness, their status as labourers and 
hence their subjugated position within the MA from 1854. Only in 1932 
424
ANNE KUKUCZKA
was the label Tamang officially introduced by a government decree – an 
event differently interpreted by scholars and activists like Parshuram 
Tamang. Furthermore consensus exists among most scholars that a 
pan-Tamang identity is a comparatively recent phenomenon and thus 
advocating an instrumentalist approach towards the study of ethnic-
ity, scholars highlight the role of the state and the context-dependency 
of the production of ethnic categories. Today Tamang belong to the 
well-organized groups in Nepal, a fact that partly can be attributed to 
Parshuram Tamang who was closely connected with NEFIN and decid-
ed on the international advocacy road to get support for his visions 
and the movement as a whole. It is crucial to note that most activists 
by virtue of both having an intellectual university background and be-
ing members of their respective group follow an agenda and have the 
knowledge and authority to speak for the group as a whole. However, 
‘ordinary’ people and activists do not necessarily share the same view 
on issues related to ethnic identity, the interpretation of history and 
resulting claims. Therefore ethnic activism can possibly result in the 
homogenization of a group by promoting a certain set of practices and 
features and denying others. 
With the discussion of arguments and issues highlighted by the NTG 
and the TRD, I have tried to show how the adivasi janajati movement 
has unfolded itself between 1990 and 2010. Whereas in the early years 
the emphasis was on creating a distinct Tamang identity to legitimate 
claims over resources e.g. language development, today the argumen-
tation of the NTG and TRD is located within the discourse of ethnic ter-
ritories based on ancestral homelands. Claims for autonomous ethnic 
territories gained more prominence at the end of 1990s when the adi-
vasi janajati movement had already established itself as an important 
actor and possessed more influence and self-awareness. Finally, as the 
article has aimed to demonstrate, it has been political agendas arising 
in a particular historical context that shaped different actors’ definition 
and usage of the concept of ethnicity. 
Endnotes
  
1 In this article I use the term ‘ethnic group’ to designate groups 
officially recognized as adivasi janajati. Therefore the Hindu popula-
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tion is not described as an ethnic group. However, in the case of Nepal 
the common notion of a minority-majority approach in defining ethnic 
groups is challenged since no single group accounts for more than 50 
percent of the total population and Dahal (1995: 166) suggests that a 
particular group can be at the same time majority and minority depend-
ing on the specific economic, political, social context. 
2 This number is based on the 2001 census for castes and ethnic 
groups. If excluding Chhetri and Bahun, the Magar form the largest 
ethnic group with 7.1 percent, followed by the Tharu constituting 6.8 
percent. Census data for population by mother tongue differ slightly 
and identify 5.2 percent of the population as Tamang mother tongue 
speakers. For critical comments on the Nepalese Census’ methods of 
data collection see Gurung 1997: 520; Pradhan 2002: 5.
3 The Panchayat period was commenced in 1960 with the over-
throw of the first democratic ally elected government by King Ma-
hendra thereby abandoning the democratic developments which had 
been taking place between 1959 and 1960 after the Rana regime was 
overturned in 1951.
4 A term introduced by Anderson in his seminal work “Imag-
ined Communities”. There he argues that even though members of a 
particular nation do not know each other on a personal level, the idea 
of a shared community exists in their minds (Anderson 1983: 15). 
Since ethnic activists in Nepal like Parshuram Tamang think of their 
respective group as a “nation” or “nationality” it seems appropriate 
to apply the term also on a smaller scale and in a non-European con-
text. 
5 In the Nepali context of ethnic activism, theories on nation-
alism are of particular interest since they can be used to critically 
examining the relation between the state and its citizens. In addition 
Gellner (1997: 10) for example emphasizes the fact, that in many 
languages no distinction is made between nationalism and ethnicity. 
6 See for example Schneiderman’s A Critique of the Study of 
Kinship (1984) for a critical examination of kinship. There the author 
argues that despites its earlier usage as a universal feature of human 
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kind, kinship is an academic category and to a certain extent the in-
vention of western anthropologists that privileges western concepts 
in interpreting other people’s realities at the expense of emic catego-
ries. 
7 The new political climate also enabled scholars to focus on these 
sensitive issues while research was much more restricted during Pan-
chayat times.
8 Republished in 2008 under the title Nationalism and Ethnicity in 
Nepal. 
9 Fürer-Haimendorf (1975: 234) for example notes, that Tibetan-
speaking groups in the far west refer to themselves as  Tamang in official 
contexts and the same is true for people in Langtang and Karmarong 
(Höfer 1979: 149). The reasons for this strategy can not be discussed 
in detail here, yet the designation Bhote or Bothiya for Tibetan-speaking 
groups bears a derogative connotation indicating backwardness and a 
lack of loyalty towards the Nepalese state. Significantly in Humla, a re-
gion in Nepal’s far west, people formerly classified as Bhotiya were told 
to be Tamang by government officials in the first half of the  nineteenth 
century. The reason might have been to prevent Tibetan claims over 
Nepalese territory. Therefore it was crucial to present people living in 
the border area as proper Nepalese citizens (Levine 1987: 79-80). 
10 The term Murmi may have derived from Tibetan mur for frontier 
and mi for people. The shift from Murmi to Tamang reflects a transfor-
mation from the margins of Tibetan to the margins of Nepalese society 
of the population designated by the term (Macdonald 1975: 129). 
11 A similar situation is reported by Holmberg (2005, 1989: 20) 
for the community of western Tamangs, who also differentiate between 
Ghale and Tamang. 
12 Whereas some scholars argue caste is a defining feature of 
South Asian society, little consent exists on how caste ultimately should 
be interpreted. Furthermore in the last three decades scholars started 
focussing on the at least partial British colonial impact in the creation of 
categories such as caste. It is crucial to note, that Nepali does not differ-
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entiate between ethnic group and caste – the term jat is used for both in 
daily life as well as legal documents like the Muluki Ain (MA) from 1854. 
Only very recently educated Nepalis started to apply the term jati when 
referring to ethnic groups and jat when referring to caste (Gellner et al. 
2008, 1997: 541). The article cannot aim to provide a final definition 
of the term caste. Therefore I will deploy the term caste according to 
its usage in the conventional academic literature on Nepal and jat when 
referring to the MA. 
13 The hereditary rule of Rana Prime ministers lasting till 1951 
began in 1846 when Jang Bahadur Rana gained power through the Kot 
massacre. Consequently the Shah kings were reduced to the statues of 
symbolic monarchs, while all the power remained with the Ranas.
14 The implementation of the MA and its consequences for Nepal’s 
population varied within the country depending on the level of admin-
istration already established. It was particularly strong in areas with a 
high proportion of Parbatiyas while groups living in high mountain areas 
were less confronted with and influenced by the regulations of the MA 
(Höfer 1970: 40). 
15 Höfer (1979: 37-42) argues that the MA was a necessary tool 
to re-legitimate the identity of Nepal based on a national Hindu caste 
hierarchy against British India while at the same time motivating the 
solidarity of her citizens. The MA presented a caste hierarchy support-
ing and strengthening the dominant position of its ruling Parbatiya elites 
while covering all people of the kingdom within a single Hindu hierarchy 
under Gorkhali rule. 
16 Whereas the literacy rate among Bahun is 58 and among Chhetri 
42 percent, janajati literacy rate is limited to 35 percent (excluding Ne-
war, among whom literacy rate is 54.8 percent). The literacy rate among 
Dalits is reported even lower with 23.8 percent. Considerable differenc-
es also exist in terms of life expectancy. Life expectancy among Bahun 
amounts for 60.8, among Chhetri 56 and among Newar 54.8 years, in 
contrast janajati’s  life expectancy only averages 53 years (NESAC out-
comes as presented in Hacchetu 2003: 226); Detailed statistics about 
the representation of janajati groups in the House of Representatives 
and Member’s of parties’ Central Committee and their interpretation are 
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provided in Hacchetu 2003: 239; Krämer 2002: 179-198. 
17 Lama-Tamang (cited in Onta 2003: 321) distinguishes between 
fourteen different types of organizations based on their main topics of 
activism: religious, culture, development and advocacy, language and 
literature, social service, songs and music, history and museums, jour-
nalism, lawyers, intellectual and civil society, NGOs, women’s issues, 
student affairs, adviasi janajati political parties, ethnic liberation fronts 
and councils. Though, most organizations focus on more than one issue.
18 The more stabilized political situation in Nepal after 2006 when 
government and Maoists signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
might have contributed to the growing number of organizations. 
19 A detailed analysis of the shifting of meanings in the course of 
ethnic activism in Nepal using the example of the boycott of Dashain 
by the Mongol National Organization after 1990 is provided by Hangen 
2005. See Pfaff-Czarnecka 2003 and Campbell 1995 for an analysis of 
Tamang communities who no longer celebrate the Hindu festival. 
20 Among the founding members there were two Rai organizations 
and one organization for each of the following ethnic groups: Gurung, 
Magar, Newar, Limbu, Rai and Tamang (Gellner and Karki 2008: 109). 
Only five groups are currently without representatives in NEFIN: Banka-
riya, Hayu, Kusunda, Phree, whose main settlement area is in the hills 
and Raute who live in the Inner Tarai. Gellner et al 2008: xxvii. 
21 For detailed information on NEFIN’s objectives and missions as 
well as the JEP consult www.nefin.org.np; a summary of the challenges 
NEFIN is currently facing is provided by Hangen 2010: 40f. 
22  At present 69 armed liberation groups are reported for Nepal. 
Most of them are based in southern Nepal and seek an autonomous 
Tarai state (Phatak and Uprety 2009: 4). 
23 The Task Force Report Committee included six Nepalese mem-
bers: three politicians, an anthropologist, a development sociologist and 
a secretary of the Ministry of Local Affairs (Gellner and Karki 2008: 110). 
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24 Three formerly separately listed villages decided to form one 
ethnic group, the Tingaule, while the Manangis  decided to belong to the 
Gurungs. The Yakha were listed as a separate group on the latter list 
(Gellner 2007: 1824, 1828).
25 Onta (2006: 316f.) states that the basis for this classification 
provided by NEFIN and later accepted by NFDIN is to a certain extend 
obscure. NEFIN classified the groups using various human development 
parameters, but did not submitted a detailed list of those parameters 
to NFDIN. For critical comments on the definition in general see Onta 
2006: 314ff.  
26 A counter definition on the basis of race, paraphrased with the 
term “Mongol” was promoted by the Mongol National Organization in 
sharp contrast to NEFIN’s and the majority of janajati adivasi organisa-
tion’s definition of adivasi janajati, which was mainly based on cultural 
features. However this parallel discourse was not able to attract support 
among the ethnic organizations in Nepal (Hangen 2010: 49-57). 
27 When in 1998 the Maoist formed the “Tamang National Libera-
tion Front” some frustrated and more radical orientated cadres joint 
them. But this is only a marginal numbers of activists and therefore the 
exception (Lama-Tamang, 2009: 285). 
28 The under-representation of women within the janajati adivasi 
movement and the absence of any forum to address women’s issues 
and the persisting patriarchy led to the foundation of the National In-
digenous Women Federation (NIWF) in 2000. Today organizations from 
31 different ethnic groups are brought together under this umbrella 
organization. 
29 Radio Nepal started broadcasting in eight languages in 1994, 
Tamang was one of them (Sonntag 1995: 113).  
30 Among 56 languages evaluated in a survey by Yadava (2007), 
six managed to produce materials in all categories mentioned. Besides 
Tamang, the other languages were Awadhi, Hindi, Limbu, Maithili, Ne-
wari and Sherpa. 
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31 During the ‘people’s war’ the Maoists answered to ethnic dis-
content and incorporated demands of ethnic activists into their agenda, 
which brought them considerable support. In 2003 they declared eight 
of nine autonomous regions by holding massive public ceremonies in 
the respective areas (Gellner et al. 2008: xxix- xxx). 
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Appendices
I: The Caste Hierarchy as presented in the Muluki Ain of 1854 
1. tagadhari “Wearers of the holy cord”
Upadhyaya Brahman
Rajput (Thakuri) (“warrior”)  
Jaisi Brahman 
Chetri (Ksatri) (“warrior)
 Dew Bhaju (Newar Brahmins) E
 Indian Brahmin
Ascetic sects (e.g. Sannyasi) 
“Lower” Jaisi
Various Newar castes * E 
2. namasinya matwali “Non- enslavable Alcohol- drinkers”
Magar * E
Gurung * E
Sunuwar * E
Some other Newar Castes * E 
3. masinya matwali “Enslavable Alcohol- drinkers”
Bhote * E
Cepang * E
Kumal (potters) *
Hayu * E
Tharu * E
Gharti (descendants of freed slaves) * 
4. pani nacalnya choi chito halnunaparnya impure, but “touch-
able” castes 
Kasai (Newar butchers) E 
Kusle (Newar musicians) E
Hindu Dhobi (Newar washermen) E
Kulu (Newar tanners) E
Musulman *
Mleech (European) *
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5. pani nacalnya choi chito halnuparnya untouchable castes 
Kami (blacksmith)/ Sarki (tanners/ shoemakers) 
Kadara (stemming from unions between Kami and Sarki) 
Damai (tailors and musicians) 
Gaine (minstrel) 
Badi (musicians) 
Pore (Newar skinners and fishermen) E
Cyame (Newar scavengers) E
E - ethnic group 
* - position (status) within the caste group is not precisely determined  
 Source: Muluki Ain as presented in Höfer 1979: 45. 
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II: Classification of 59 Adivasi Janajatis Based on Socio-  
Economic Status, NFDIN Act 2002

